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Comments
THE ACTION OF RESOLUTION AS AN ACCESSORY
OF THE CREDIT IN CONTRACTS OF SALE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
ART. 2561. If the .buyer does not pay the price the seller
may sue for the dissolution of the sale. This right of dissolu-
tion shall be an accessory of the credit representing the price,
and if it be held by more than one person all must join in the
demand for dissolution; but if any refuse, the others by pay-
ing the amount due the parties who refuse shall become sub-
rogated to their rights.,
The most important obligation which the civil law of Loui-
siana imposes upon the purchaser of movable or immovable prop-
erty under the contract of sale is the payment of the purchase
price.2 The seller is vested with two security interests' either of
which may be exercised in the event this obligation is not per-
formed. (1) He may enforce the sale and exercise his vendor's
privilege which gives him a preference over other creditors on the
proceeds of a judicial sale of the property.4 (2) He may effect a
resolution5 of the sale and a return of the property by taking.ad-
vantage of the resolutory condition 6 which is implied by law in
all commutative contracts.7
1. Italics indicate the portion of the article added by La. Act 108 of 1924.
2. Arts. 2439, 2549, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. The seller is also given the right to retain the property if the sale
be for cash and the price is not paid at the time and place of delivery. Arts.
2475, 2487, La. Civil Code of 1870. In the case of a credit sale, the seller
may refuse to deliver to an insolvent or bankrupt buyer where there is
danger of losing the purchase price unless security therefor is furnished.
Art. 2488, La. Civil Code of 1870. Where the buyer is insolvent the seller
is also given the right of stoppage in transitu and of recovery of the prop-
erty even though it has been attached by a creditor of the buyer. Blum &
Co. v. Marks, 21 La. Ann. 268, 99 Am. Dec. 725 (1869). Cf. Uniform Sales
Act, § § 57-59, 61, 62; 5 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1937) § 1458.
4. Arts. 3182-3189, 3227 (movables), 3249, 3271-3274 (immovables), La, Civil
Code of 1870.
5. Art. 2561, La. Civil Code of 1870. This article applies to movables and
immovables. Cf. Arts. 2562, 2563, 2564, La. Civil Code of 1870; Johnson v.
Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699, 705 (1857).
6. The "resolutory condition" is a condition subsequent. Ballentine, Law
Dictionary (1930).
7. Arts. 2045, 2046, 2047, La. Civil Code of 1870. Article 2561 is an appli-
cation of the principles embodied in these codal articles. Thompson v. Kil-
crease, 14 La. Ann. 340 (1859); Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583
(1886); Yeager Milling Co. v. Lawler, 39 La. Ann. 572, 2 So. 398 (1887); Wat-
son v. Feibel, 139 La. 375, 71 So. 585 (1916). At common law the right of
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For the exercise of the vendor's privilege on movable prop-
erty, there is no requirement of recordation,8 but the privilege
may be enforced only so long as the property remains in the pos-
session of the vendee.9 In the case of a sale of immovable prop-
erty, the privilege may be enforced to the prejudice of third
parties only if the sale has been properly recorded.10 This is not
true of the resolutory condition. Nowhere in the Civil Code can
there be found any requirement of recordation of the sale in
order that the action of resolution may be enforced with respect
to either movable or immovable property. However, it has been
held that as to the sale of movables, by analogy to the codal
articles relative to the vendor's privilege,1 the right of resolution
for non-payment of the purchase price may be exercised only as
long as the property remains in the possession of the original
vendee.12 In sales of immovable property, the resolutory action
resolution for non-payment of the purchase price is not implied and cannot
be exercised unless it had been expressly made a condition in the contract.
Watson v. Feibel, 139 La. at 391, 71 So. at 591; Benjamin, Sales (7 Am. ed.
1899) 791; 5 Williston, op. cit. supra note 3, § § 1456, 1458; Uniform Sales Act,
§ 61.
The wisdom of the adoption by Louisiana of the civil law implied reso-
lutory condition in all commutative contracts and of its enforcability with-
out the necessity of recordation has been severely questioned. Watson v.
Feibel, 139 La. 375, 71 So. 585 (1916); Troplong, Le Droit Civil Expliqu6, de la
Vente, II (5 ed. 1856) 92, no 620.
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 19; Art. 3227, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Cf. National Bank of Commerce v. Sullivan, 117 La. 163, 41 So. 480 (1906).
9. Arts. 3227, 3228, 3230, La. Civil Code of 1870; Dreyfous v. Cade, 138
La. 297, 70 So. 231 (1915); D. H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 188 La. 431, 177 So.
417 (1937). However, if the vendor has properly obtained and recorded a
chattel mortgage, he may have a judicial seizure and sale of the property
in order to be reimbursed the purchase price even though the property has
passed from the possession of the immediate vendee into the hands of third
persons. See La. Act 198 of 1918, as amended by Acts 81 of 1922, 232 of
1924, 157 of 1928, 166 of 1932, 189 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § § 5022-5036.1];
La. Act 67 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 5036.2]; La. Act 178 of 1936
(Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § § 5023, 5025, 5026]; Daggett, The Chattel Mort-
gage in Louisiana (1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 162; (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 19;
(1939) 13 id. 234.
10. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 19; Arts. 3271, 3273, 3274, La. Civil
Code of 1870; Perot v. Chambers, 2 La. Ann. 800 (1847); Morrison v. Citizens'
Bank, 27 La. Ann. 401 (1875); State ex rel. Slocomb v. Rogillio, 30 La. Ann.
833 (1878); Allen-Wadley Lumber Co. v. Huddleston, 123 La. 522, 49 So.
160 (1909).
11. Arts. 3227-3230, La. Civil Code of 1870. See note 9, supra.
12. Lalance Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Wolff & Levi, 28 La. Ann. 942 (1876).
See Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699, 702 (1857); Allen, Nugent & Co.
v. Buisson, 35 La. Ann. 108, 109 (1883). Cf. Daugherty v. Vance, 30 La. Ann.
1246 (1878); Morgan v. Tolle, 168 La. 496, 122 So. 594 (1929). But see Wilmot
& Co. v. Steamer Ouachita Belle, 32 La. Ann. 607, 612 (1880), in which the
rule of the Lalance case is criticized.
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has been held to exist independently of recordation of the sale 3
and of the vendor's privilege and mortgage.1
The resolutory action has been brought successfully not only
against the immediate vendee,15 but also against a third party
into whose possession the property has passed regardless of the
good faith of such third persons.16 However, this right cannot be
exercised against a third person who, in good faith, has acquired
rights to the property in reliance upon affirmative evidence in
the public records showing that the entire purchase price had
been paid."' If the record does not show this affirmatively, all
persons are presumed to know that the law authorizes the vendor
to exercise the resolutory action even to the prejudice of third
parties.
From the foregoing it may be seen that the action of resolu-
tion has enjoyed a unique status among the remedies available
to the unpaid vendor. In interpreting Article 2561 of the Civil
Code prior to 1924,'1 the courts held that to maintain the action
of dissolution successfully, a restitutio in integrum'9-a restora-
13. Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); Ragsdale v. Rags-
dale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1901).
14. Stevenson v. Brown, 82 La. Ann. 461 (1880). See Gonsoulin v. Adams
& Co., 28 La. Ann. 598, 599 (1876).
15. Templeman v. Pegues, 24 La. Ann. 537 (1872); School Directors v.
Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876).
16. Such third parties have included: the judgment creditor of the
vendee-Le Bourgeois v. Le Bourgeois, 23 La. Ann. 757 (1871); Ragsdale v.
Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1901); his mortgage creditor-Johnson v.
Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); Adler v. Adler, 126 La. 472, 52 So. 668
(1910); his unsecured creditors-Torregano v. Segura's Syndic, 2 Mart. (N.S.)
158 (La. 1824); subsequent purchasers from the vendee-McKenzie v. Bacon,
41 La. Ann. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889); and purchasers at a judicial sale of the
vendee's property-Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461 (1880); cf. Gonsoulin
v. Adams & Co., 28 La. Ann. 598, 599 (1876). Also remote assuming vendees
of the original vendee have been affected by the action of resolution. Thomp-
son v. Kilcrease, 14 La. Ann. 340 (1859). Cf. Landry v. Hawkins, 156 So. 795
(La. App. 1934), where the vendee's mortgage successfully prevented the en-
forcement of the right of resolution.
17. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 166
La. 201, 116 So. 851 (1928), and authorities therein cited.
18. The article then simply read: "If the buyer does not pay the price
the seller may sue for the dissolution of the sale."
19. Compliance with the prerequisites necessary to the successful main-
tenance of the action of resolution is essential In order to effect a voluntary
retrocession of property sold In lieu of the judicial dissolution of the sale
for non-payment. Otherwise, the transfer by the vendee to his vendor will
be considered as a reconveyance. Power v. Ocean Ins. Co., 19 La. 28, 36 Am.
Dec. 665 (1841); Fulton v. Fulton, 7 Rob. 73 (La. 1844); Chretien v. Richard-
son, 6 La. Ann. 2 (1851); Shields v. Lafon, 7 La. Ann. 135 (1852); Nash v.
Muggah, 23 La. Ann. 539 (1871); Payne v. Nowell, 41 La. Ann. 852, 6 So. 636
(1889); Liquidators of Prudential Savings & Homestead Soc. v. Langermann,




tion of matters as though the sale had never taken place-must
be accomplished. 0 Thus, it was held that: (1) the parties to the
contract of sale and to the action must be the same-from this it
followed that the whole claim for the purchase price must be
represented or the action would fall, and if more than one person
held the right to resolve all must join since there was no provi-
sion whereby the dissenting holders could be forced to relinquish
their rights in favor of their co-owners;2 1 (2) the seller must
tender or return the portion of the purchase price paid by the
buyer together with interest thereon;22 (3) the buyer must re-
turn the property free of all encumbrances and alienations which
he created 23 together with rents and revenues which accrued
during his possession, less the cost of necessary improvements;"6
(4) third possessors claiming through the buyer must return
rents and revenues which accrued during their possession.2 5
Prior to 1924, the right of resolution granted by Article 2561
was personal to the vendor and, consequently, was not ipso facto
transferred with the sale of the promissory note which had been
given for the purchase price.26 The right to resolve the sale for
non-payment was likewise lost where the purchase money note
was transferred for value with the indorsement "without war-
ranty or recourse," and even a subsequent reacquisition of the
note by the vendor would not effect a restoration of the resolu-
20. Art. 2045, La. Civil Code of 1870; Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38 La.
Ann. 583 (1886); McKenzie v. Bacon, 41 La. Ann. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889); Ragsdale
v. Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1901); Bankston v. Owl Bayou Cypress
Co., 117 La. 1053, 42 So. 500 (1906). Cf. Frantom v. Rusca, 182 So. 331 (La.
App. 1938).
21. Augusta Ins. Co. v. Packwood, 9 La. Ann. 74 (1854); Swan v. Gayle,
24 La. Ann. 498 (1872); Barron v. Jacobs, 38 La. Ann. 370 (1886); Heirs of
Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583 (1886). See Ward v. Hayes-Ewell Co., 167
La. 884, 887, 120 So. 585, 586 (1929). Cf. Leflore v. Carson, 7 La. Ann. 65 (1852);
Bryant v. Stothart, 46 La. Ann. 485, 15 So. 76 (1894).
22. School Directors v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876). See George v.
Knox, 23 La. Ann. 354, 355 (1871). Cf. Ware v. Berlin, 43 La. Ann. 534, 9 So.
490 (1891); Cappel v. Hundley, 168 La. 15, 121 So. 176 (1929).
23. Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); Stevenson v. Brown,
32 La. Ann. 461 (1880); Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1901);
Adler v. Adler, 126 La. 472, 52 So. 668 (1910).
24. School Directors v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876); McKenzie v.
Bacon, 41 La. Ann. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889); Ware v. Berlin, 43 La. Ann. 534, 9 So.
490 (1891); Cappel v. Hundley, 168 La. 15, 121 So. 176 (1929).
25. McKenzie v. Bacon, 41 La. Ann. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889). Cf. Art. 2506, La.
Civil Code of 1870.
26. Swan v. Gayle, 24 La. Ann. 498 (1872); Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38
La. Ann. 583 (1886); Hamilton v. State Nat. Bank, 39 La. Ann. 932, 3 So.
126 (1887). See People's Bank v. Cage, 40 La. Ann. 138, 140, 3 So. 721, 722
(1888); Payne v. Nowell, 41 La. Ann. 852, 855, 6 So. 636, 637 (1889). Contra:
Torregano v. Segura's Syndic, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 158 (La. 1824); Citizen's Bank
of Louisiana v. Cuny, 12 Rob. 278 (La. 1845).
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tory right since the vendor did not remain liable on the instru-
ment as an indorser.27 The leading case of Swan v. Gayle2 8 held
that the right to dissolve the sale for non-payment of the price
was not an "accessory to the note evidencing the unpaid price"
and that, therefore, such right was not transmitted as an incident
to the sale of the note.2 9 But this case did not pass upon the ques-
tion of whether or not that right could be assigned. Subsequent
cases have indicated, however, that this right was assignable if
the transfer of the note were accompanied by a special act of
subrogation by the vendor.80
The doctrine of Swan v. Gayle3t was extended in Temple-
man v. Pegues32 to apply to a situation where the vendor sued the
vendee to dissolve a sale of land for non-payment of the price
after the purchase money notes had prescribed by the lapse of
five years.8 8 The theory was that the action of resolution was in-
dependent of the right to enforce payment of the notes and not
being an accessory to them was not affected by their prescrip-
tion.8 4 The action to enforce the resolutory condition was itself
held to be prescribed by the lapse of ten years from the date of
maturity and default in the payment of the first of several notes
given for the purchase price.8
5
27. People's Bank v. Cage, 40 La. Ann. 138, 3 So. 721 (1888).
28. 24 La. Ann. 498 (1872).
29. Id. at 502.
30. Hamilton v. State Nat. Bank, 39 La. Ann. 932, 3 So. 126 (1887). See
Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583, 588 (1886); People's Bank v. Cage,
40 La. Ann. 138, 140, 3 So. 721, 722 (1888). In the Floyd case, the concurring
opinion (at pp. 591-593) presents the very logical argument that the right of
resolution should pass with the assignment of the purchase money note with-
out any special act of subrogation by the vendor. As to the principles an-
nounced by the jurisprudence prior to 1924, the statement made by a recent
writer that "this right to dissolve is personal and non-transferable" appears
to be too broad. See Monroe, The Implied Resolutory Condition for Non-Per-
formance of a Contract (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 376, 390.
31. 24 La. Ann. 498 (1872).
32. 24 La. Ann. 537 (1872).
33. Art. 3540, La. Civil Code of 1870.
34. In accord: School Directors v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876).
35. The jurisprudence has consistently held that the action to dissolve the
sale accrues at the moment the buyer is in default of payment of the pur-
chase price; and regardless of whether it be payable in a lump sum at a
future date or by installments, the ten year prescriptive period commences
from the date of default in a payment. George v. Lewis, 11 La. Ann. 654
(1856); Thompson v. Kilcrease, 14 La. Ann. 340 (1859); George v. Knox, 23
La. Ann. 354 (1871); Gonsoulin v. Adams & Co., 28 La. Ann. 598 (1876); Latour
v. Latour, 134 La. 342, 64 So. 133 (1914).
1 Pothier, Obligations (Evans translation, 3 ed. 1853) 496, declares:
"When a debt is payable at several terms, I see no inconvenience in hold-
ing that the time of prescription begins to run from the expiration of the
first term, for the part then payable, and for the other parts only from the
day of expiration of the respective terms of payment."
The general American rule is that when recovery is sought on a note
1939] COMMENTS
In sum, under Article 2561 of the Code prior to its amend-
ment in 1924, three very important rules were formulated by the
jurisprudence with reference to the right of resolution of the sale
of immovable property for non-payment of the purchase price.
(1) If more than one person held the right to dissolve the sale,
all had to join as parties plaintiff or the action would fall, and
there was no statutory provision whereby dissenting co-owners
of this right could be compelled to surrender their interest so that
the right could be exercised by the others.30 (2) The transferee
of promissory notes representing the purchase price could not
sue to dissolve the sale for non-payment unless by a special act
of subrogation the vendor had assigned this right in addition to
the right to enforce payment.37 (3) The action of resolution sur-
vived the prescription of the purchase money notes-"the credit
evidencing the price"-by five years.38 The last two rules were
both based upon the assumption that the right of dissolution was
not an accessory of the credit representing the price.
In 1924, the Legislature amended and re-enacted Article 2561
of the Civil Code by adding the following:
"This right of dissolution shall be an accessory of the credit
representing the price, and if it be held by more than one
person all must join in the demand for dissolution; but if any
or other obligation payable by installments, the statute of limitations runs
against each installment from the time it becomes due; that Is, from the time
when an action might be brought to recover it. Note (1933) 82 A.L.R. 316,
325. Cf. George v. Knox, supra, at 355, where Wyly, J., dissents on the ground
that prescription should run against the resolutory action in a like manner,
and consequently that the action is prescribed only where ten years have
elapsed from the date of maturity and default in the payment of the last
installment of the series. But in Edwards v. White, 34 La. Ann. 989 (1882),
and Pike v. Charrotte, 39 La. Ann. 300, 1 So. 895 (1887), it was held that
the action of dissolution accrues at the time of the non-payment of such
installments as come within the prescriptive period, If the payment of
earlier unpaid installments is expressly remitted and the obligations dis-
charged. For example, if the price be a lump sum payable in several install-
ments, one of which becomes due every year, and the payment of the first is
remitted by the vendor, and the second is not paid at maturity, the pre-
scriptive period runs against the action to dissolve from the latter date.
36. Augusta Ins. Co. v. Packwood, 9 La. Ann. 74 (1854); Swan v. Gayle,
24 La. Ann. 498 (1872); Barron v. Jacobs, 38 La. Ann. 370 (1886); Heirs of
Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583 (1886); McKenzie v. Bacon, 41 La. Ann. 6, 5
So. 640 (1889); Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1901); Bankston
v. Owl Bayou Cypress Co., 117 La. 1053, 42 So. 500 (1906).
37. Swan v. Gayle, 24 La. Ann. 498 (1872); Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38
La. Ann. 583 (1886); Hamilton v. State Nat. Bank, 39 La. Ann. 932, 3 So.
126 (1887).
38. Templeman v. Pegues, 24 La. Ann. 537 (1872); School Directors v.
Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876).
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refuse, the others by paying the amount due the parties who
refuse shall become subrogated to their rights.""9
Under the Article as thus amended, it would appear that the
right of dissolution was affected as follows: (1) Although the
whole claim for the purchase price must still be represented in
order to maintain the action successfully, the parties to the con-
tract of sale and to the action need no longer be the same, for if
any of the holders of the right of dissolution refuse to join in its
exercise the others may become subrogated to their rights by pay-
ing the amount due to them and thereafter may proceed to sue.4
(2) The right of dissolution, being made "an accessory of the
credit representing the price,' 41 is an accessory for all possible
purposes and is consequently acquired by the purchaser of the
note given by the vendee without any special act of subrogation
by the vendor. (3) Although the action of dissolution is pre-
scribed by the lapse of ten years, the action now being "an acces-
sory to the credit" is extinguished with the extinction of the
buyer's obligation to pay the price-that is, with the prescription
of the purchase money note.
42
The general characteristic of an accessory right 3 is embodied
in the maxim accessorius sequitur principalem (an accessory fol-
lows or depends upon the principal) .44 This feature is embodied
39. La. Act 108 of 1924. There has been no jurisprudence since 1924
which has satisfactorily dealt with all the possible effects of this change
in the law. As there is no qualifying or restrictive language indicating other-
wise, the statute seems to cover sales of both movables and immovables.
40. The items of payment covered by the "amount due to the parties who
refuse" would appear to include the pro rata share of the dissenting co-
owners in the unpaid portion of the purchase price together with such share
of the rents and revenues which must be returned. Otherwise the require-
ments of the restitutio in Integrum would not be fulfilled.
41. The cases of Torregano v. Segura's Syndic, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 158 (La.
1824), and Citizen's Bank of Louisiana v. Cuny, 12 Rob. 278 (La. 1845), an-
nouncing this principle, appear to have been re-established, while the pre-
viously leading case of Swan v. Gayle together with its jurisprudence appears
to have been overturned by the 1924 amendment. Cf. Haas v. Haas, 182 La.
337, 162 So. 5 (1935).
42. The last two views are not in accord with opinions expressed in a
recent law review article. However, the effect of La. Act 108 of 1924 upon
the right of resolution does not appear to have been considered. See Mon-
roe, supra note 30.
43. An accessory right or obligation has been defined as "something
which may aid to enforce the principal obligation." Swan v. Gayle, 24 La.
Ann. 498, 503 (1872). The Civil Code definition is in Article 1771, La. Civil
Code of 1870: "An accessory contract is made for assuring the performance
of a prior contract, either by the same parties or by others; such as surety-
ship, mortgage and pledge."
44. Art. 2645, La. Civil Code of 1870 states: "The sale or transfer of a
credit includes everything which is an accessory to the samf; as suretyship,
privileges and mortgages." (Italics supplied.)
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in the Code and in the jurisprudence with regard to mortgages,4
privileges" and other security devices, 47 each of which is trans-
ferred with the assignment of the principal obligation to which
it is by nature attached. It is only reasonable to conclude that
the Legislature intended the word to have the same meaning
here.
Perhaps the most far reaching effect of the 1924 Act which
made the resolutory right "an accessory of the credit" was to
make the right coexistent with the purchase money note. The
extinction of the latter by prescription or otherwise would nec-
essarily entail the extinction of the former. If a purchase money
note has prescribed, 48 no legal rights may be predicted thereon."
With the prescription of the note, the legal obligation of the
buyer ceases to exist, for all that remains is a natural obligation
to pay the price for which the law does not provide a remedy.50
Even independently of statute, it seems more in accord with legal
principles that the vendor should not be granted the right of dis-
solution in this situation, for to do so would not discharge the only
45. Arts. 2645, 3278, 3284, 3285, 3411, La. Civil Code of 1870; Blood v. Vol-
lers, 6 La. Ann. 784 (1851); Oakey & Hawkins v. The Sheriff, 13 La. Ann. 273
(1858); Frost v. McLeod, 19 La. Ann. 80 (1867); L. H. Gardner & Co. v. Max-
well, 27 La. Ann. 561 (1875); Perkins v. Gumbel, 49 La. Ann. 653, 21 So. 743
(1897); Gaines v. Bonnabel, 168 La. 262, 121 So. 764 (1929).
The right to foreclose a mortgage, being but an accessory right, is effec-
tually extinguished by the extinction of the debt upon which it is founded,
whether the mode of extinction was by payment, prescription or otherwise.
Succession of Virgin, 18 La. Ann. 42 (1866); Morano v. Shaw, 23 La. Ann.
379 (1871); Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367 (1927) (extinction by
payment); McDaniel v. Lalanne, 28 La. Ann. 661 (1876) (extinction by pre-
scription). This is so even though the act creating the vendor's privilege
and mortgage has been timely reinscribed. Art. 3369, La. Civil Code of 1870;
State ex rel. Landry v. Broussard, 177 So. 403 (La. App. 1937) (extinction by
prescription of the note).
46. Arts. 2645, 3186, 3227, 3249, 3277(3), La. Civil Code of 1870; Auguste v.
Renard, 3 Rob. 389 (La. 1843); Jeckell v. Fried, 18 La. Ann. 192 (1866). See
Succession of Forstall, 39 La. Ann. 1052, 1057, 3 So. 277, 278 (1887). Cf. State
ex rel. Landry v. Broussard, 177 So. 403, 404 (La. App. 1937).
47. Arts. 3035, 3059, La. Civil Code of 1870. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra
note 35, at 306: "It results from the definition of a surety's engagement,
as being accessory to a principal obligation, that the extinction of the prin-
cipal obligation necessarily induces that of the surety; it being of the nature
of an accessory obligation, that it cannot exist without its principal; there-
fore, whenever the principal is discharged, in whatever manner it may be,
not only by actual payment or a compensation, but also by a release, the
surety is discharged likewise. .. "
48. Art. 3540, La. Civil Code of 1870, treats of this prescriptive preiod.
49. Arts. 3457, 3459, 3528, La. Civil Code of 1870. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra
note 35, at 327, declares: "It is the nature . . . of all accessory obligations
that the extinction of the principal obligation induces that of the acces-
sory. .. .. "
50. Arts. 1757(2), 1758(3), La. Civil Code of 1870.
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legal obligation which the buyer, in the absence of a contrary
agreement, is under a duty to perform.51
When the right of dissolution exists independently of recorda-
tion and is not an accessory of the credit, it constitutes a secret
lien which can be enforced even against third parties who acquire
the property in reliance upon clear public records.52 This con-
tradiction of settled public policy was eliminated in France by a
law of 1855. 51 Louisiana has not yet taken care of this situation
completely; however, the hardships of the situation have been
considerably alleviated by the 1924 Act, as herein discussed."4
CONCLUSION
In summary, the most reasonable and logical conclusions to
be drawn from Act 108 of 1924, amending and re-enacting Article
2561 of the Civil Code, appear to be as follows:
1. The right of resolution of the sale for non-payment of
the purchase price is now open to one or more holders of the
right to whom the vendee is legally obligated to pay the price.
51. Cf. Arts. 2439, 2549, La. Civil Code of 1870.
52. The rigidity and detail with which the Code requires the recordation
of acts of sale and all other instruments affecting Immovable property to be
effective against third parties should be the most convincing proof that third
parties are to be protected In the absence of recordation. Public sentiment
against unrecorded encumbrances upon Immovables has found expression
both In the Civil Code and in every state constitution since 1868. See Arts.
2246-2270, 3271, 3273, 3274, 3342-3370, La. Civil Code of 1870; and La. Const.
of 1868, Art. 123; La. Const. of 1879, Arts. 176, 177; La. Consts. of 1898 and
1913, Arts. 186-187; La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 19. The constitutional pro-
visions may be found in Long, Constitutions of the State of Louisiana (1930)
553-555.
53. Lol sur la transcription en matire hypoth6calre, 23 mars 1855, 1
Codes et Lois pour la France, l'Alg~rie et lea Colonies (20 ed. Colin 1925)
400, Petite Collection Dalloz, Code Civil (1938) 844, under Art. 2203: "Art. 7.
L'action rdsolutoire 6tablie par rarticle 1654 du Code Napoleon ne peut tre
exerc6e, apr~s 'extinction du privilge du vendeur, au pr6judice des tiers
qui ont acquis des drolts sur l'immeuble du chef de l'acqu6reur, et qui se
sont conform6s aux lois pour lea conserver."
"The resolutory action established by Article 1654 of the Code Napoleon
cannot be exercised after the extinction of the vendor's privilege to the prej-
udice of third parties who have acquired rights in the immovable through
the vendee, and who have complied with the law to protect them." (Transla-
tion supplied.)
A similar law should be enacted In Louisiana.
54. The only result of the suggested Interpretation of the statute which
might conceivably be considered a hardship is that the vendor or subsequent
holders of the purchase notes will be deprived of their right of resolution
after the notes have prescribed. Indeed, the right of resolution, as formerly
exercised, effectively nullified the operation of our prescription laws. The
principles of public policy relative to prescription of the principal right (to
demand payment) would seem to apply as well to the accessory right of
resolution. In Templeman v. Pegues, 24 La. Ann. 537, 539 (1872), on the
original hearing Mr. Justice Wyly gives an excellent statement of the public
policy underlying the laws of prescription.
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2. The right of resolution is an accessory of the purchase
money note representing the price so that such right is trans-
ferred by the vendor without any other act than the mere
assignment of the note to another, and this right ceases to
exist after the note has prescribed.
W. T. PEGUES
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURANCE
CONTRACTS; HOSPITALIZATION
Courts always have great difficulty in distinguishing con-
tracts of insurance' from other contracts containing obligations
contingent upon the happening of certain events. Examples of
the latter are contracts for the performance of personal services,
contracts which provide for contingent incidental benefits, and
contracts of warranty and guaranty.2 This discussion is confined
chiefly to the problem involved in those insurance contracts in
which the promisor, for a consideration, undertakes to do some
act valuable to the insured upon the happening of a specified
event. Because of the vital importance to the general public of
the recent rapid increase in the number of plans for the distribu-
tion of the costs of hospitalization, 8 special consideration will be
given to that type of contract.
The problem focuses on the application of the varying defi-
1. The decisions involving the question of whether a company is trans-
acting the business of insurance arise principally under the state regulatory
acts, the question being presented in diverse ways: Hunt v. Public Mut. Bene-
fit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938) (injunction sought by com-
pany); South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 184 S.E. 875 (Ga. 1936)
(injunction sought by state); State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287, 14 AtI. 195 (1888)
(action for penalty); Fikes v. State, 87 Miss. 251, 39 So. 783 (1906) (prosecu-
tion of agent); State ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St.
90, 76 N.E. 567 (1905) (mandamus by company); State v. Western Auto Sup-
ply Co., 134 Ohio St. 163, 16 N.E. (2d) 256 (1938) (quo warranto). However,
the action may be a private one: Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v.
Guillaume, 222 Ill. App. 543 (1921); Marcus v. Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa.
429, 88 Atl. 678 (1913).
2. For a complete discussion of the difficulties in distinguishing between
contracts of insurance and other contracts of contingent obligation, see
Vance, Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 57-65, §§ 23-25.
3. The largest group hospitalization insurance plan in the United States
was announced on June 9th by Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., chairman of General
Motors Corporation. Times-Picayune, June 10, 1939, p. 2, col. 7.
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